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Has Adam Gadahn Forsaken the Lawful Jihad for Anti-Americanism? A Case 
Study of Ideological Contradictions
by Paul Kamolnick
And if you say that this barbaric style is known in your tribal traditions, or your people’s traditions, 
or tolerated by your Shaykh or Emir, we would say: It is not allowed in our Islam . . . A fight that is 
not guided by the Shari’ah rules is not honored.[1]
We denounce any operation carried out by a Jihadi group that does not consider the sanctity of Mus-
lims and their blood and money. We refuse to attribute these crimes to Qa’ida al-Jihad Organization. 
. . .This position and the judgment is not to be changed if the act is carried out in the name of Jihad 
or under the banner of establishing Shari’ah and the legal measures, or under the name of promot-
ing virtue and preventing vice. As long as it is forbidden in God’s religion, we are disassociated from 
it.[2]
I have no doubt that what is happening to the Jihadi movement in these countries is not misfortune, 
but punishment by God on us because of our sins and injustices, or because of the sins of some of us 
and the silence of the rest of us.[3]
Abstract
Despite his importance as a senior Al-Qaeda spokesman, no detailed examination exists of Adam Yahiye 
Gadahn’s employment of fiqh al-jihad—that branch of Islamic jurisprudence regulating the lawful waging 
of jihad—to condemn or condone violence committed in the name of Al-Qaeda. This article first provides a 
detailed exposition of Gadahn’s sharia-based critique of affiliates’ conduct deemed by him in violation of Islamic 
law and involving the commission of major sins. Second, Gadahn’s conception of fiqh al-jihad is contextualized 
and contrasted with the comprehensive fiqh al-jihad-based critiques produced by respected militant Islamist 
scholars. A key finding here is that Gadahn (unlike these scholars) illicitly truncates the application of fiqh al-
jihad with the result that he demands sharia-compliance when criticizing intra-Islamist violence yet ignores 
sharia-compliance when targeting America and Americans. Third, reasons are considered for this incoherent 
application of fiqh al-jihad and attempted Islamic legalization of anti-American mass casualty terrorist attacks. 
Finally, the discussion concludes with implications for counter-Al-Qaeda strategy.
Keywords: Adam Gadahn, Al-Qaeda, Fiqh al-Jihad, Anti-American mass casualty terrorism, counterterrorism
Introduction
The declassification of 17 documents captured during the United States government (USG) May 2, 2011 
raid on then Al-Qaeda emir Usama bin Laden’s compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, offers scholars a rare 
opportunity to study candid internal discussions among Al-Qaeda’s Senior Leadership (AQSL).[4] One of 
these documents is a 21-page single-spaced letter [5] authored by al-Qaeda senior communications operative 
Adam Yahiye Gadahn (aka: Azzam al-Amriki).[6] Composed about four months before the Abbottabad 
raid,[7] two themes are prevalent. In response to queries by AQSL’s highest echelons, Gadahn supplies 
detailed suggestions for AQSL information warfare (i.e. ‘media’) strategy including a nuanced analysis 
of target audiences, messengers, messaging, and media.[8] He also produces a searing critique of certain 
affiliates and associates guilty of illicitly shedding Muslim blood. Though obviously frustrated by how this 
blood spilling subverts AQSL’s messaging strategy, Gadahn’s chief concern is moral and religious-legal. 
He boldly urges AQSL to formally disavow and disassociate from these groups’ illegal, sinful conduct, and 
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actually pens a model declaration.
Analyses and commentary exist of Gadahn’s media-related operations, [9] ascent to a surprisingly senior 
position in AQSL,[10] and his vehement denunciation of intra-Muslim bloodshed.[11] Beyond noting this 
latter concern, however, to date no systematic analysis exists of Gadahn’s employment of fiqh al-jihad—that 
branch of Islamic jurisprudence regulating the lawful waging of jihad—to condemn or condone violence 
committed in the name of or in alleged sympathy with AQSL.
Why focus on Gadahn’s employment of fiqh al-jihad? First, AQSL’s legitimation as a salafist vanguard is 
based in its insistence that it fully emulates the path of the righteous ancestors (al salaf al salih) striving and 
struggling in the path of Allah to raise Allah’s Word (jihad fi sabil Allah li I’la’ kalimat Allah), and that it does 
so by righteously adhering to the Divine shari’a. Gadahn’s letter provides decisive evidence, however, that he 
illicitly restricts the scope of fiqh al-jihad proscriptions and prescriptions to intra-Islamic bloodshed. By so 
doing he evades condemnation of, and often sanctions, other types of forbidden (haram) conduct including 
that associated with perpetrating mass casualty terrorist attacks against America and Americans. This finding 
is of particular relevance to United States Government (USG) personnel tasked with formulating strategy to 
disrupt, dismantle, and ultimately defeat this terrorist adversary.[12]
Second, it is prudent to take Gadahn’s sharia-based justifications or condemnations of ‘jihadist’ terrorist 
actions very seriously: they are functionally-related to his current status as a high-visibility official AQSL 
spokesperson charged with inspiring, inciting, and mobilizing English-speaking and Arabic-fluent audiences 
to attack the ‘Zionist-Crusader’ alliance. Gadahn has appeared this past decade in over 42 videos produced 
by AQSL’s official media site al-Sahab (The Clouds). His sharia-based arguments and agitational propaganda 
have been prominently displayed in five of twelve issues of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s (AQAP) 
English-language online magazine Inspire. Gadahn’s article, “Besiege Them: Practical Steps Toward the 
Liberation of Palestine and the Restoration of the Caliphate,” is the featured cover story in the Fall 2014 
inaugural issue of Resurgence: AQSL’s brand new English-language publication targeting the Indian Sub-
continent.[13]
This analysis is organized as follows. First, a detailed exposition is provided of Gadahn’s sharia-based critique 
of affiliates’ conduct deemed by him to be in violation of Islamic law and involving the commission of major 
sins. Second, Gadahn’s conception of fiqh al-jihad is contextualized and contrasted with the comprehensive 
fiqh al-jihad-based critiques produced by religious scholars associated with a group of militant Islamist 
scholars that can be collectively labeled a “Corrections Current” (a term explained later in this discussion).
[14] A key finding here is that Gadahn, unlike these scholars, illicitly truncates the application of fiqh al-
jihad with the result that he demands sharia-compliance when criticizing intra-Islamist violence yet ignores 
sharia-compliance when targeting America and Americans. Third, reasons are considered for this incoherent 
application of fiqh al-jihad and attempted Islamic legalization of anti-American mass casualty terrorist 
attacks. The article concludes with implications for counter-AQSL strategy.
Gadahn’s Shari’a Case Against Intentional Homicide Committed by Muslims
Gadahn presents a shari’a-based critique of affiliates’ conduct deemed by him to be in violation of Islamic 
law and involving the commission of major sins. Qur’an, ahadith (traditions of the Prophet Muhammad), 
ijma (scholarly consensus), qiyas (analogical reasoning), and empirical history—major sources used by 
religious scholars to render religious opinions or verdicts (fatawa)—are introduced as evidence in support of 
his vehement request that AQSL openly disavow and disassociate from these murderous Muslims.[15] This 
request rests on the following three sub-arguments:
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The Murderous Mujahidin
Gadahn alleges that the Pakistani Taliban (Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan), Somalian Harakat al-Shabab al 
Mujahidin (aka: al-Shabab, ‘The Youth’), and the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI)[16] are guilty of the commission 
of major sins. This conclusion rests on two premises: that these groups commit intentional homicide; and 
that this spilling of Muslim blood is a major sin in Islam.
Murderous Agents.
First, Gadahn cites various facts that have been reported and corroborated by reliable sources, and 
representing a mere “drop from a flood.”[17] Fourteen bombings are cited responsible for the murder of 
hundreds of innocent Muslims, and maiming of thousands more. These attacks, designed to kill regime 
targets or tribal foes, were conducted in playgrounds, marketplaces, mosques, public thoroughfares, 
the University of Islamabad, a graduation ceremony for new medical doctors in Somalia, checkpoints, 
restaurants, and many places “crowded with pedestrians, residents, and shoppers.” As a direct consequence, 
these murderous Muslims turned everyday life into nightmarish scenarios, shattering lives and families, and 
supplanting Muslim security and sanctity with horrific carnage.[18]
Second, Gadahn demonstrates the logical absurdity of two attempts by the culpable party to disassociate 
themselves from murderous conduct. In an attempt to deny responsibility for the murder of 70 Muslims and 
maiming of many others, the TTP’s Tariq ‘Azam and Wali al-Rahman Mehsud contacted the press and laid 
blame on the security contractor Blackwater. They also, Gadahn claims, “denied any relation between [the] 
Taliban Pakistan movement and Faisal Shahzad, who tried to blast Times Square in New York.” Their blatant 
dishonesty is proven, however, since following these very incidents “there was a film broadcast by (‘Umar 
Studio) the[ir] media branch” claiming responsibility for these attacks. A second incident involved using an 
Uzbek propaganda outlet Umma Studio’s own words to confirm their murderous assaults, since they openly 
“pledge [i.e. promise] in all rudeness to explode the mosques, as revenge for the attack on the Red Mosque, 
and to bombard other mosques at the tribal areas.”[19]
Gadahn concludes this evidentiary phase of his case with two stories.[20] In the first he recounts a 
conversation with a young Arab volunteer who had been told by his father that Egyptian militant Sayyid 
Qutb’s writings demand that every existing mosque should be viewed as a den of spies, informers, and 
agents of the ruling regime, and therefore destroyed. “I told him,” Gadahn recounts,” fine, if you see that 
they are mosques of evil, tear them down, but do not explode them when the praying people are inside 
them.” He concludes: “Imagine; a young man ready to detonate a mosque with what it includes, based on a 
generalization of what was stated by Sayyid Qutb, may God bless his soul.”[21] The second story was relayed 
to him by a militant whose task it was to reinforce a Taliban unit. This person asked the Taliban commander 
what the commander would do if for some reason his designated target, the Pakistani army, did not show up. 
The commander in charge stated that they should then target the Shi’a, and if the Shi’a were not present, the 
religious hypocrites, and if no hypocrites, someone from the general public or a passerby. “The head of the 
outside group was so angered and disputed him, [and] the local leader was embarrassed and stated that he 
was joking. The head of the outside group replied, ‘How could you joke like that in front of your soldiers and 
members?’.”
Murderers are Major Sinners.
It is permissible in the context of warfare with non-believers to kill (or risk having killed) innocent Muslims. 
39ISSN  2334-3745 December 2014
PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM Volume 8, Issue 6
Known as Muslim Tirs or Human Shields (al-Tatarrus), this is only permissible, however, under conditions 
of extreme duress and dire necessity, as a last resort even if one is under attack, and only within the context of 
a truly defensive jihad (jihad al-daf).[22] Gadahn cites Qur’an, Hadith, and reasons by analogy to prove that 
the TTP, al-Shabab, and the ISI violate these stringent rules governing al-Tatarrus and therefore are guilty of 
committing murder.[23]
Beyond Qur’an and a hadith, Gadahn employs analogical reasoning (qiyas) to demonstrate that the 
murderous carnage of the present has direct parallels to previous epochs whether committed by ultra-
fanatical Muslim sects, medieval genocidal warriors and tyrants, or more contemporary despotic regimes. 
There are also profound dissimilarities between past epochs of lawfully regulated warfare and present-day 
murderous mayhem. “It is known that taking over of mosques and spilling the [blood of] innocents, was 
known throughout history to be associated with the worst groups and individuals,” he states. And this 
despite the fact “that their blood is never allowed to be spilled, nor money taken or dishonor, or hurt him 
or branding him an infidel, except upon a legal proof clearer than the noonday’s sun.”[24] “Have you not 
remembered that you are fighting in the Muslim towns and not in the infidel’s fortresses?” Gadahn asks. And 
instead of a military-on-military fight against a predatory Crusader power’s army you “detonate a mosque 
full of praying individuals, or any other place where Muslims gather, just for the sake of killing one of the 
individuals present in that location.”[25] The indiscriminateness, viciousness, and lack of any necessity 
for this barbarism of method serves as undeniable evidence of the most heinous of sins possible in Islam, 
or any faith. “If that targeted person really deserves to be killed,” he declares, “why not employ another 
method rather than random attacks, which is not tolerated by any mind or religion.[One] [w]hich does not 
differentiate between an enemy and a friend, the child and the old man, the man and the woman and the 
Muslim and the infidel?”[26]
Finally, Gadahn identifies two additional religious-legal violations beyond al-Tatarrus. Retributive justice 
(qisas) in Islam demands that limits be honored and that the repayment for a wrong not exceed the harm 
caused: indeed, Allah is more desirous of generosity and forgiveness—of compassion and mercy—than 
strictest justice let alone punitive vengeance. For example, in Quran 2:190 placed by Gadahn at the head of 
his model Declaration of disavowal, it states: “God almighty has stated: “Fight in the cause of Allah those who 
fight you, but do not transgress limits; for Allah loveth not transgressors.”[27]
Violating retributive justice is joined by another egregious sin: the replacement of Allah’s shari’a by other 
sources of legislation that usurp Allah’s right to legislate. Calling the TTP’s murderous attacks on Muslims 
to task, he declares, “A fight that is not guided by the Shari’ah rules is not honored. If the fight adheres to 
the tribal traditions and human opinions that violate the Shari’ah whose ruling is no different from the 
constitutions and man-made laws, we should repudiate them and those rules should not be followed.”[28]
Mute Satans?
After establishing responsibility for the sinfulness of murdering Muslims as fact and law, Gadahn’s second 
sub-argument is also empirical and legal, and deals with the question of AQSL’s potential complicity in sin. 
Specifically, is AQSL religiously obligated to openly disavow and disassociate from those whom it accuses 
of having committed major sins? And by implication, Does failure to do so make AQSL complicit in those 
major sins? Gadahn’s answer is “Yes” to each. 
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The Religious Obligation to Publicly Condemn and Disavow Openly-Publicized Forbidden Wrongs.
Gadahn begins by invoking the requirement binding on all Muslims as a matter of righteous living to enjoin 
the good and prohibit wrongful conduct (al-amr bil-ma’ruf wa’l-nahy ‘an al-munkar).[29] This murderous 
sinful conduct committed by persons claiming an association with AQSL’s jihad places greater responsibility 
on AQSL. The public professions made by these murderous Muslims can no longer be dealt with in secret as a 
matter of brotherly Muslim admonition and instruction of ignorant, wayward souls. The nature and publicity 
given this sinfulness, and AQSL’s aversion to publicly and unreservedly disavow these sins, have now become 
a vital religious matter. AQSL’s religious and legal responsibility substantially differs since:
The known repudiated act is judged differently from that of which no one is aware except the one 
committing it. The last type works in secrecy, and not to announce it—with some exceptions—while 
the first type is where denial is in the open. This benefits the others who would be willing or planning 
to do it or imitate the one doing it. And for other reasons, this disclosure of denial is what we ignored 
here. This made our denial incomplete and not qualifying to its basics, and God knows best.[30]
Gadahn’s reasoned dissent from any path other than public disavowal is unequivocal. For example, he 
dissents from those who successfully influenced Shaykh Atiyatallah, a key AQSL religious scholar, to remove 
from his fatwa a specific condemnation of the groups involved. “Those who advised him to delete that part,” 
Gadahn remarks, . . . “argued that we should not admit that such acts were committed from within our ranks: 
that means we have to impose a media silence!”[31] “This is a mistake from many aspects,” he continues:
The matter is religious and a fatwa and an order for virtue and a prevention of vice, and not a 
simple “organizational secret” of the type that we may impose a media silence on. Hiding the right, 
and delaying its details when in need, has strong religious implications, as is well known. Now that 
the matter is exposed to all, near and far, our silence will lead to be despised by people and despising 
ourselves, as we look in front of all as “Mute Satans.” We see the forbidden committed, and make no 
move, or look like compromisers, praising the killers while they are alive, and condole them when 
dead, and count them as good doers, irrespective of what we know about them of immorality. We 
look in the best of cases as inattentive who are not aware of what is happening around us.[32]
The necessity for a public disavowal is further buttressed by several related points. For example: Gadahn 
cites Prophet Muhammad’s own public disavowal of a fellow Muslim soldier; the insufficiency of individual-
level condemnations of specific personalities about whom one may be ignorant, and the demand to publicly 
renounce—“loving the actor for what it has in virtues and hating him for what he has of vices and deviating 
from the path of the Shari’ah.”; current operational security concerns prohibit the type of private counsel 
that could be had if persons could be brought together to confront these sins with Shari’a proofs; [33] and 
“the narrowness of the visions of those spoken to, their small minds, and the inclination of their hearts to 
brutality, ruthlessness, excess and intolerance to the statements of men and their banners.”[34]
The “level of the[se] repudiated acts and . . . type” demand severe, public accountability. But what of those 
who claim such a public disavowal will harm the ‘jihadi’ cause, for example by dividing the ranks of the 
mujahidin, or exposing the movement to enemy propaganda, or other reasons? To each of these Gadahn 
offers a rebuke. It is possible that a division of ranks will occur, but it is certain that these acts have “stained” 
the movement and it is therefore “better for them not to be in the ranks of the Mujahidin . . .[and that they] . 
. . should be removed and sanitized and cleared from the ranks.” And as for exposing one’s weaknesses to the 
enemy, there is no one but these bloody murderers and those complicit in their acts, who are to blame for the 
mosque preachers’ and public’s present revulsion.
[T]hese attacks are—I swear—a greater shame and more horrible weak points, and it has been 
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exploited by the enemies to a great extent. It has been exploited to distort the picture of the pious and 
loyal Mujahidin. Now many regular people are looking at the Mujahidin as a group that does not 
hesitate to take people’s money by falsehood, detonating mosques, spilling the blood of scores of people 
in the way to kill one or two who were labeled as enemies. . . . The blame—or most of it—is laid on 
our shoulders. We contributed to that by not clarifying our stand on those forbidden acts in a suffi-
cient way. We also contributed to the continuation of the perpetrators in their acts, by deferring the 
accusation from the contributors and blaming Blackwater Company instead.[35]
Those (Including AQSL) Knowledgeable of Widely-Publicized Major Sins Who Do Not Disavow and 
Disassociate from Those Who Commit Them are Accomplices in Sin. 
An inescapable corollary follows from the above case proving murder, its sinfulness, and the publicized 
fanatical ruthlessness and openly-avowed vengeance driving these so-called mujahidin. To know, and not to 
disavow, is to partake and be complicit, in this sinful murder. “The acquittal of the organization,” he states, 
“[is] . . .not just an empty media-driven step.”[36]
In a model formal declaration, then, Gadahn provides all core elements which he believes should exonerate 
AQSL, himself included. “We refuse to attribute these crimes to Qa’ida al-Jihad Organization” and should it 
“be proven that those responsible for it are connected with the organization, the organization will take the 
appropriate measures towards them.” In his model “Acquittal and Warning,” he has AQSL openly denounce:
[A]ny armed operation that targets the Muslims in the places of their gathering, and any operation 
that does not account for the sanctity of their blood, souls, bodies, belongings or money. . . .[T]he 
explosive operations that takes place in the center of markets, streets, restaurants, and hotels that are 
packed with Muslims. It also includes, as a first principal, the detonation of mosques on the heads of 
the innocent praying public, shattering their bodies. Associated with that is exposing the Qur’an and 
the religious books to indignation and destruction.[37]
It is no longer possible to attempt to rectify these “horrible acts” using private channels; this sinning except 
for a few exceptions continues unabated since “there are some who insist on following a wrong method and a 
distorted jurisprudence for the sake of taking revenge. . . at the expense of innocent Muslims.” It is immaterial 
whether these acts are conducted “in the name of Jihad or under the banner of establishing Shari’ah and the 
legal measures, or under the name of promoting virtue and preventing vice” since as Gadahn declares “[a]
s long as it is forbidden in God’s religion, we are disassociated from it.”[38] Finally, Gadahn cites Qur’an, 
hadith, and analogies to prove that it is Allah’s shari’a that must be followed and no obedience is owed to any 
man, including one’s emir, if it requires that one violate this shari’a. The gravity attending the taking of life is 
so great, its consequences so profound, Gadahn urges every available means to ensure this prohibition is not 
transgressed. In short, a Muslim’s “blood is never allowed to be spilled, nor [his] money taken or dishonor, or 
hurt him or branding him an infidel, except upon a legal proof clearer than the noonday’s sun.”[39]
“Not Every Martyr in This World is A Martyr on the Day of Judgment.”
Gadahn’s condemnation of murder—whether as direct perpetrator or indirect accomplice—concludes with a 
dire warning. One may claim to be engaged in acts deemed holy to Allah, in this case killing or being killed 
during various ‘jihadi’ or ‘martyrdom’ operations. But whether that is actually the case is to be determined 
by Allah alone. Given the types of legal violation involved, i.e. intentional homicide, it is most unlikely that 
Allah has reserved Paradise for those guilty of such.
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Intentional Homicide is Unforgiven.
Martyrdom is a privilege that may be granted by Allah to those who sacrifice by fighting and dying in the 
path of Allah to make Allah’s Word supreme.[40] Gadahn identifies several categories of sinner whom despite 
their participation in the military jihad, Allah shall deny martyrdom—for example, persons who die without 
having discharged debts owed to creditors.[41] From this fact he then reasons by analogy, “how about he who 
has killed scores or even hundreds of Muslim souls that he killed in absolute injustice. He is more eligible 
to be denied the heaven.” [42] Or citing a tradition from Sahih-Muslim we learn that Prophet Muhammad 
denied an Islamic death to persons whose disobedience, narrow group biases, partaking of evils, and 
dishonoring of pledges led them beyond the faith community.[43] Forgiveness is, as we earlier saw, one of the 
cardinal qualities of Allah’s nature. Nevertheless, according to Gadahn,Allah does not forgive on the Day of 
Judgment those who intentionally spill the blood of innocent Muslims. Citing Qur’an 4:93-94:
If a man kills a believer intentionally, his recompense is Hell, to abide therein (Forever): And the 
wrath and curse of God are upon him, and a dreadful penalty is prepared for him. O ye who believe! 
When ye go abroad in the cause of God, investigate carefully, and say not to anyone who offers you 
a salutation: “Thou art none of a believer!” Coveting the perishable goods of this life: with God are 
profits and spoils abundant. Even thus were ye yourselves before, till God conferred His favors: there-
fore carefully investigate. For God is well aware of all that you do.
And citing Sahih-Bukhari, “The Prophet (Peace Be Upon Him–PBUH) stated, ‘The believer is within the 
realm of his religion as long as he did not target forbidden blood. . . ‘”[44] Further, that Prophet Muhammad 
denied martyrdom and assured Hellfire to those, despite active participation in jihad, whose acts led them 
beyond the pale of belief.[45]
The Fires of Gehenna Shall Consume the Flesh of Allah’s Unforgiven Sinners.
Eternal hellfire (Gehenna), not Paradise at the right hand of Allah, awaits those unforgiven and unredeemed 
sinners guilty of the willful, unnecessary, and brutally callous destruction of the life, honor, and property 
of innocent Muslims. Gadahn is emphatic in his demand: “We warn those responsible for those crimes, of 
disgrace in this lifetime and painful torture in the other. The consequences of injustice are grave, and injustice 
is the darkness of the Day of Judgment.”[46]
Adam Gadahn’s Critique in Light of the Militant Islamist ‘Corrections Current’ Scholars
Gadahn has focused above on those elements of the TTP, al-Shabab, ISI, and others who mimic the methods 
of murderers whose sins Allah shall not forgive on the Day of Judgment. They are therefore destined to be 
privileged martyrs in Paradise but condemned sinners eternally consumed in Gehenna’s flames. Gadahn 
alleges that this destined fate is an inescapable consequence of these Muslims having violated the shari’a 
regulating Muslim use of human shields (al-Tatarrus). A tactic that should be used as an absolute last resort 
under circumstances of dire necessity has instead become a tactic of choice leading to the indiscriminate 
slaughter of hundreds of Muslims whose only crime is to have been praying in the mosque at the time a 
revenge-seeking member of an organization detonated a bomb to ensure his target was shrapnel-filled and 
crushed beneath the concrete of its exploded structure.
The sins involved are among the gravest known to Islam, second only to the denial of Allah’s indivisibility 
and absolute sovereignty. If one has unjustly taken a life given by Allah that by inviolable right is entitled to 
dignity, honor, and property, then one has denied Allah’s shari’a since, as Kamali states, “[t]o say that Islamic 
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law originates in divine revelation implies that adherence to its rules is at once a legal and religious duty.”[47]
While it is highly likely that Gadahn in other communications has addressed the universal reach of Allah’s 
shari’a, intra-Muslim murder is the exclusive focus of the above-examined letter. And, as stated earlier, 
Gadahn’s principled legal and religious concerns clearly outweigh his pragmatic media-related frustrations. 
The present author has no knowledge of Gadahn’s potentially more extensive sharia-based critiques that 
explicitly engage Muslim rights and responsibilities in relation to non-Muslims, or of Muslims deemed sharia 
non-compliant but not guilty of violating al-Tatarrus. Two results follow. From Gadahn we neither learn 
about other types of religious-legal violations of fiqh al-jihad, nor of a broader Islamic moral universe within 
which potential religious-legal violations are haram. To read this letter, and only this letter, is to emphasize a 
single albeit very significant legal principle—al-Tatarrus. But what happens when we examine a fuller range 
of potential criticisms that concern not just intra-Islamist murder but all forms of haram conduct during the 
jihad?
From this perspective a more comprehensive account of potential fiqh al-jihad violations is useful, one that 
through comparison and contrast will permit greater awareness of the nature and intended scope of Gadahn’s 
shari’a critique. Many critiques of haram conduct during jihad have been produced by Muslim scholars and 
ulema. However, many contemporary scholars deny the religious obligation to wage jihad, or lack credibility 
because of their proximity to a ruling regime or regime-apologetic writings.[48] A credible alternative is 
available, however.
The “Corrections Current” is a label given by the present author for an emergent body of scholarship 
authored by militant Islamists whose credibility derives from three bases: they regard the military jihad 
as a genuine religious prescription binding on observant Muslims until the Day of Judgment; they have 
participated as activists, militants, and occasionally actual fighters, in jihad; they are regarded by observant 
militant Islamists as learned religious scholars of fiqh al-jihad possessing unimpeachable integrity.[49] Table 
1 (provided below at the end of this discussion) presents these comprehensive fiqh al-jihad prescriptions and 
proscriptions. We first focus on shared premises, and then points of profound disagreement.[50]
Shared Premises: Jihad-Realist Militant Islamist Common Ground in Fiqh al-Jihad
Beyond the presumption of sincerity of intention, and the obligatory religious prescription to wage jihad,[51] 
Gadahn/AQSL and the Corrections Current share four premises.
• Sacredness of Muslim Life. The life, honor, and property of every Muslim is sacred and intentional 
homicide is a cardinal sin whose moral gravity is second only to the denial of the singularity and 
sovereignty of Allah.[52]
• Moderation; al-Wasattiya. Fanaticism, extremism, and immoderation violate explicit and 
unambiguous Islamic tenets and traditions. Immoderation is the gateway to violations of the shari’a, 
and most often results in undermining the interests and values of the Umma.[53]
• Muslim Tirs. al-Tatarrus. The sanctity of life, and specific conditions that must be met for jihad to be 
waged, almost always render impermissible the killing of a Muslim, even if it is done unintentionally.
• Against Takfir of Persons, Society (of Muslims, versus Regimes). The impermissibility of takfir—-
declaring another Muslim an apostate, and therefore rendering their lives and property forfeit—
stressing especially its historic consequence in undermining social solidarity, sowing chaos, creating 
disorder, facilitating dissension (‘fitnah’), and unleashing mayhem.[54]
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These shared fundaments are logically related to the maximizing of Islamic dignity, and its maximal 
expansion; grounded in the Allah-derived rights to life, honor, and property; and related to the very function 
of the shari’a in its role of protecting and advancing the five essentials (al-daruyiyat al-khamsa) of life, 
religion, property, intellect, and family, that anchor dignified Muslim existence.[55]
Unshared Premises/Principled Disagreements: Militant Islamist Divergence in Fiqh al-Jihad
In his letter, Gadahn only tangentially addresses the United States. But his few comments, especially when 
corroborated with additional open source comments, provide sufficient evidence for the judgment that 
he accepts the shariatic justifications AQSL has used in its declaration of war and terrorist attacks against 
America and Americans. For example, his discussion of media strategy focuses on the the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks (September 11, 2011) making reference to “the tenth anniversary of the Manhattan raid.”[56] He 
also invokes AQSL’s Manichean dichotomy—US Crusader/AQSL Defender—in referring to “Bush’s Crusade 
wars”[57] and following his discussion of earlier epochs of brutality directed at Muslims, to “the Americans, 
the Arab and foreign tyrants, like the kings of Hejaz and Najd, Syria’s rulers, and the Pakistani ruler Pervez 
Musharraf.”[58] His letter contains not a single shariatic reference or argument condemning 9/11 or the use 
of mass casualty terrorist methods to attack Americans on American soil. Finally, in a recent video entitled 
“The Crime of Kidnapping Abu Anas al Libi and its Repercussions,” Gadahn in the context of exonerating 
al Libi states: “Teach the Crusaders a lesson they will not forget. Teach them that the lands of Islam are a red 
line and there is no place in them for soldiers, forces and bases. . . Rise and have vengeance against America, 
the enemy of Islam and the Muslims, and restore us the glory of Nairobi, Dar es Salam, Aden, New York, 
Washington, Fort Hood, Benghazi and Boston.”[59]
Assuming then Gadahn’s sympathy for 9/11 and AQ’s terrorist modus operandi directed against America 
and Americans, Gadahn/AQSL fundamentally differs from the Corrections Current scholars on several key 
principles and rulings in fiqh al-jihad (see Table 1 below). These differences can be summarized as follows: 
[60]
Jihad and Its Rightful Role in Islam. 
The goal of Islam is the raising of Allah’s Word by all permissible means, including the Call or preaching 
(Da’wa), enjoining the good and forbidding evil (hisbah), and–when legally permissible, advisable, and of 
definite benefit for Allah’s Word,–jihad. Jihad as a means is irreducible to its military dimension, however, 
and includes striving and struggling in the Way of Allah by combating one’s own immoral thoughts, soul, 
and deeds (jihad bil nafs); speech (jihad bil lisan) and the written word/knowledge (jihad bil qalam/ilm); 
behavioral and physical coercion to prevent evil and promote the good (jihad bil yad); and finally, the use 
of the sword (jihad bis saif). Restricting the universe of means available for raising Allah’s Word to one 
only—military jihad—is illogical and deviant. Imagine, for example, elevating prayer (Salat), alms (Zakkat), 
pilgrimage (Hajj), or the Ramadan fast (Sawm)” so that one could be a Salatist advocating “Salatism,” or one 
advocating “Zakkatism” or “Sawmism” or “Hajjism.” This is not Islam, but a deviant embrace of a singular 
means. ‘Jihadism’ and ‘jihadist’ are equally deviant when severed from their relation to other means, and the 
noble objective itself of Raising Allah’s Word.[61] 
Legal Military Jihad versus ‘Jihadism’. 
Jihad is an enduring religious obligation. However, because of the seriousness of such a declaration—the 
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equivalent of a declaration of just war in the West [62]—waging jihad is only permissible if one has taken 
explicit and careful account of abilities, circumstances, conditions, and the costs involved (relative to 
perceived benefits, and perceived alternative courses of action) that this ennobled religious prescription 
demands. ‘Jihadism’ is characterized by unlawful, inadvisable risk-taking in matters of military action—
eschewing for example, legal and customary requirements regarding the relative strength of one’s opponents; 
capacity to wage jihad; availability of less-costly options (i.e. da’wa, enforcing the good and forbidding evil, 
isolation, emigration, etc.); and costs to the Umma. 
Prudent Military Jihad versus Reckless ‘Jihadism’.
A pragmatic, prudential substrate exists in Islam, as in every other great faith, that relates desired ends to 
available means, and evaluates courses of action in relation to the actual benefits that arise for its intended 
beneficiaries. It is on these grounds that bin Laden’s unilateral decision to launch the 9/11 attack was 
calamitous for Islam. A deeply observant Muslim who is also wisely pragmatic may then ask: How has 
Usama bin Laden’s so-called jihad benefitted Islam? What has been the cost to Islam and Muslims worldwide 
of Al-Qaeda’s unilateral decision to declare, launch, and wage a terrorist campaign against America and 
Americans?
The Sacredness of Every Human Life in Islam: Is Only Muslim blood Sacred to Allah?
Despite the privileged sanctity Muslims hold within Allah’s shari’a, that shari’a is universally applicable 
and relevant to every possible violation of any part of Allah’s creation. Every creature, every feature of the 
universe, and, in the present context, every human being whether Muslim or non-Muslim, is of moral, 
legal, and religious concern within this shari’a. Due to the sacred nature of all life—its absolute sanctity—
persons must be secure in their lives, persons, property, possessions, and honor. Allah is the Creator of all 
human souls. As Qur’an 4:1 states: “O mankind! Reverence your Guardian-Lord, who created you from a 
single person, created, of like nature, his mate, and from them twain scattered like seeds countless men and 
women.” While Allah privileges those who have sworn loyalty and disavowed the existence and worship 
of other deities, many categories of non-Muslim are deemed sacred in their blood, honor, and property 
and therefore inviolable.[63] This presumption is worth reciting in its holy context. For example: In Qur’an 
5:32: “On that account: We ordained for the Children of Israel that if anyone slew a person—unless it be for 
murder or spreading mischief in the land—it would be as if he slew the whole people; and if anyone saved 
a life, it would be as if he saved the life of the whole people.”; Qur’an 6:151: “ . . . Take not life, which Allah 
hath made sacred, except by way of justice and law”; The true servants of Allah, according to Qur’an 25:68 
are “Those who invoke not, with Allah, any other god, nor slay such life as Allah has made sacred, except for 
just cause. . .”. The presumptive sanctity of all human life is based in the fact that Allah created all humans and 
invested them with the moral capacity to know and choose righteousness, and to know and avoid evil. Those 
guilty of unjustly slaying Allah’s Creation thereby deny the Sovereignty and rights of Allah over all life and 
death.
Scholarly Authority in Islam: Practicing the ‘Jurisprudence of Justification’ (fiqh al-tabrir) and Fatwa Shopping.
It is impermissible to corrupt fiqh al-jihad by opportunistically producing post-hoc justifications for illegal 
acts; or failing to recognize the legitimate authority of religiously-learned experts and scholars on matters 
pertaining to shari’a and its legitimate methodology. As a corollary, one must maintain deep skepticism 
about persons whose scholarly credentials in shari’a are insufficient, particularly in such weighty matters as 
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inflicting harm and violence on others.
Declaring, Targeting and Attacking So-Called Apostate Governments: Takfir of Regime (Kufr al-Nizam).
It is only under the most dire circumstances that violently overthrowing a government would not increase 
threats to the lives, security, honor, and possessions of the umma. Apostasy that qualifies for such violent 
rebellion must involve more than negligence, sinfulness, or non-enforcement of shari’a provisions. It must 
involve active disavowal of the Islamic creed, assisting the enemies of the Umma, and overtly preferring the 
rule of men to that of Allah. Further, any consideration of violent rebellion requires a deep knowledge and 
realistic understanding of the nature of politics, political leadership, political authority, the nation-state, and 
the contemporary context within which the shari’a can realistically function.
Key Differences in Legal Rulings: Targeting and Attacking American and Americans in Islam.
The principles listed above clearly distinguish Gadahn/AQSL from the Corrections Current scholars. 
AQSL’s ‘Jihadism’ isolates and unduly privileges the military jihad as the exclusive means for raising Allah’s 
Word. Imprudent actions have replaced prudent ones, despite Islamic obligations demanding otherwise. 
Unrecognized, though with possible exception in Gadahn/AQSL, is the inviolable nature of all humans 
in their lives, honor, and property, including non-Muslims. Instead of any genuine scholar possessing 
the imprimatur of genuine shari’a training in fiqh al-jihad, it is only those whose fatawa sanction, even 
retrospectively, anti-American mass casualty terrorism, whose rulings are considered. Finally, though the 
takfir of persons and society is not practiced, the takfir of governments and declaration that they are in states 
of unbelief (kufr al-nizam) is readily announced. 
These principles described above will re-enter the analysis later in this article. But first it is necessary to 
highlight the divisions between Gadahn/AQSL and the Corrections Current scholars over a vital sub-
set of legal rulings specifically germane to AQSL’s anti-American terrorist modus operandi and 9/11 in 
particular. These constitute in essence the necessary and sufficient legal conditions required for declaring 
9/11-facilitating conduct permissible within the context of the lawful military jihad. Gadahn’s failure to 
explicitly dissent from the modus operandi in effect on 9/11 and the absence of any mention of haram 
conduct in relation to attacking America and Americans logically warrant his inclusion in the discussion to 
follow. Like the above, these are presented as Corrections Current rulings, though more directly highlighting 
their religious-legal impermissibility.
It is Impermissible to Violate One’s Oath (Bay’a) to, and Deny, an Emir’s Indivisible Sovereignty in Matters of 
Foreign Policy
Usama bin Laden despite having pledged loyalty (bay’a), knowingly and willfully disobeyed the Afghan 
Taliban emir Mullah Omar and deliberately attacked the United States from Afghan soil. Usama bin Laden 
was an invited guest enjoying complete security of person, property, and liberty of action, and was repeatedly 
told to refrain from provoking US hostilities. His impermissible actions are widely viewed as the proximate 
cause of the removal of the Taliban from power, and the calamitous consequences for Islamism arising from 
those events.
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It is Impermissible to Target the ‘Far’ Enemy.
The targeting of the nearer enemy, not a far or the furthest enemy, is an essential Quranically-derived 
obligation. Without such quranic justification, then, the strategic decision by AQSL to target the US is devoid 
of religious warrant and deviates from standard scholarly judgment regarding the prioritizing of the umma’s 
enemies.
It is Impermissible for an Organization to Declare and Fight Offensive Jihad.
The medieval circumstances dividing the world into Islamic (Dar al-Islam) and non-Islamic (Dar al-Harb; 
literally ‘Abode’ or ‘House’ of War) spheres, and conditions elevating the role of Caliph and Caliphate, no 
longer exists. Collective Muslim majorities are now territorially organized into sovereign nation-states, and 
the state is a political organ possessing a legitimate monopoly on the means and use of violence. If today 
jihad is to be declared and waged to discharge the lawful collective duty (fard kifaya) to wage offensive jihad 
to expand the Umma, this can only be declared by a legitimate sovereign on the basis of the shari’a.[64]
It is Impermissible to Violate the Principle of Retributive Justice (Qisas).
Not only does Islam maintain that charity, mercy, and forgiveness are even greater virtues than mere 
retribution—though retribution is certainly ‘just’ and does restore a lawful reciprocity—permissible conduct 
(i.e. retribution) has been replaced with terroristic conduct that is forbidden (haram). Violation of this core 
element of restitutive justice in the shari’a of lawful jihad is especially evident in select fatawa solicited by 
AQSL claiming that it is permissible to kill millions of American non-combatants allegedly guilty of directly 
and indirectly murdering millions of innocent Muslims.[65]
It is Impermissible to Deny Muslim Responsibility for Muslim Actions in the World
It is an essential principle in Islam and Islamic jurisprudence that Muslims are accountable for actions in this 
world and conspiracism is not an acceptable means for accounting for rewards and punishments experienced 
by the contemporary Muslim world. Though the free-will/determinism question in Islamic theology is a 
matter of scholarly contention, Islamic ethics and the very concept of legal culpability largely presumes that 
humans are free moral beings capable of a range of morally permissible or impermissible choices. Among 
these is the choice to worship Allah and pursue Allah’s path and various methodologies for achieving Islamist 
objectives, not US treachery or design, that is ultimately responsible for the present Muslim world’s malaise. 
[66]
It is Impermissible to Deny the Need for Parental and Creditor Consent to Wage Offensive Jihad.
Individuals participating in an offensive jihad must have these permissions. Persons participating in a 
defensive jihad, however, generally do not. The costs of abandoning one’s parents, families, properties, and 
possessions, however, must be factored in, and the ulema have issued divided opinions. What is key here 
is the necessity of fully considering the practical implications for financial dependents of one’s decision to 
sacrifice life, limb, and property in the obligation and commitment to wage the military jihad.
The Impermissibility of Targeting on the Basis of Nationality.
There is no precedent in Islam for killing persons on the basis of national affiliation. Since in the modern 
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era Muslims may, and often likely will be, living in non-Muslim societies, this invites the potential killing 
of Muslims. However, its impermissibility rests on a broader religious tradition that while distinguishing 
persons on the basis of faith, does not do so on the basis of territorial residency or citizenship. Usama bin 
Laden’s and Ayman al-Zawahiri’s claim that they are targeting “Crusaders” in the “Crusader-Zionist” alliance 
is shown to be another instance of the ‘jurisprudence of justification’.
It is Impermissible to Target Non-Belligerent Civilians, including and especially non-Muslim Civilians, Especially 
Women, Children, the Elderly, Scholars and Students of Knowledge.
Islam singles out for special protection several privileged types of person among those who are kufr (non-
believers). It is haram to violate their lives, honor, and property. What is essential is that persons least likely to 
represent a military threat are generally regarded as immune from combat-related violence.
It is Impermissible to Target Civilians at Home for Occupation Abroad.
Regardless of whether a country is presumed to be an occupying country, in this case AQSL’s presumption 
that the United States is ‘occupying Muslim lands,’ it is impermissible to harm civilians or non-combatants in 
that home country. Though AQSL’s terrorist modus operandi demands that symbolic violence be perpetrated 
on American non-combatant civilians, Islam does not practice ‘guilt by association’ nor deem collective 
punishment morally permissible.
The Impermissibility of Treachery, Violation of Oaths and Pacts of Security Granted (implicitly, or explicitly) to 
Muslims in Non-Muslim Majority societies.
The sanctity of oath-keeping in Islam is of paramount concern. Treachery is considered a cardinal sin in 
Islam, and Muslims are forbidden from dealing treacherously, even with their enemies. Further, a security 
pact (aman) governs the duty of Muslims who are provided the opportunity to enter, be secure in, and enjoy 
the liberties of life, property, possessions, and honor, in a non-Muslim society.[67]
The Impermissibility of Targeting Commercial Aviation.
Several blatant shari’a violations were committed through AQSL’s intentional hijacking of commercial 
airliners with civilians aboard to conduct the 9/11 attack. Again, one may see how AQSL’s terrorist modus 
operandi—requiring highly symbolic targets, fear-generating media exposure, and key target audiences—
starkly contrasts with Islam’s religious-legal demand that the fundaments of civilized interaction, including 
commercial exchange, contracts, and implicit presumptions of good faith, be honored.[68]
49ISSN  2334-3745 December 2014
PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM Volume 8, Issue 6
Table 1: Principled Agreement and Disagreement among Jihad-Realists in Fiqh al-Jihad: AQSL/Gadahn versus 
the Salafist Islamist Corrections Current Scholars
Rulings in
Fiqh al-Jihad/
Shari’a of Jihad
Jihad-Realist Militant Sunni Orthodoxy
Salafist Islamist
Corrections Current
AQSL/Gadahn
‘Jihadism’
PRINCIPLED AGREEMENT
[] Sacredness of Muslim Life. Yes Yes
[] Moderation in Religion. Al-Wasat. Yes Yes
[] Oppose Muslim Human Shields Yes Yes
[] Oppose Takfir of Persons, Society Yes Yes
[] Sincerity of Intention Yes Yes
PRINCIPLED AGREEMENT
[] Jurisprudence of Justification. No Yes
[] Voiding Non-Muslim Security (aman) No Yes
[] Jihadism = Islam No Yes
[] Jihadism = Military Jihad No Yes
[] Muslim Interests Sacrificed No Yes
[] Retributive Justice (Qisas) Violated No Yes
[] Offensive Jihad by Organization No Yes
[] Advocate Violent Rebellion No Yes
[] Only Muslim Life Sacred No Yes
[] Targeting Non-Belligerent Civilians No Yes
[] Treachery Permissible No Yes
[] Targeting Nationality Permissible No Yes
[] Deny Need for Parental Consent No Yes
[] Emir Sovereignty is Divisible No Yes
[] Targeting the ‘Far’ Enemy No Yes
[] Muslim Responsibility Void No Yes
[] Targeting Commercial Aviation No Yes
Discussion
It is clear from the above that Adam Gadahn insists on sharia-compliance when criticizing intra-Islamist 
murderous violence, but either disregards or fundamentally dissents from the Corrections Current scholars’ 
use of this same body of Islamic jurisprudence to condemn as haram AQSL’s anti-American terrorist modus 
operandi. The question then, is why?
Let us first consider two possible explanations. First, one might argue that Gadahn’s letter has a narrower 
focus and the broader AQSL modus operandi is not its subject matter. Several sources of evidence were 
presented by the present author, however, internal to and beyond this particular letter confirming Gadahn’s 
public stance defending AQSL’s anti-American terrorist attacks: from the 1998 East African embassy 
bombings to the more recent targeting of military personnel and civilian non-combatants at Fort Hood and 
Boston.[69]
Second, one might argue that Gadahn rejects as insincere and coerced the fiqh al-jihad critiques of AQSL 
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authored by one of the most highly regarded Corrections Current scholars former Egyptian Islamic Jihad 
emir (ca. 1987-1993) and AQSL shari’a guide, Sayyid Imam Bin-Abd-al-Aziz Al Sharif. Current AQ emir 
Ayman al-Zawahiri claims, for example, that Sayyid Imam’s writings are the coerced or insincere confessions 
of an imprisoned scholar forced to repent and in the process becoming a regime mouthpiece. However, a 
careful examination of al-Zawahiri’s evidence reveals a contradiction that undermines this assertion. In 
Zawahiri’s 2008 critique of Sayyid Imam, Exoneration: A Treatise on the Exoneration of the Nation of the Pen 
and the Sword from the Denigrating Charge of Being Irresolute and Weak[70], Sayyid Imam is also accused of 
having written in 1993—eight years previous to his Eqyptian imprisonment—a major tome running several 
hundred pages, ‘Al Jami Fi Talab al-Ilm al-Sharif’ (The Compendium of Divine Knowledge), adumbrating those 
major rectifications of which he is accused while imprisoned and likely under duress.[71] In Exoneration, 
Al-Zawahiri writes in reference to Sayyid Imam’s 2007 book, “I say: it is a great pity that these are the same 
words of the author in his book Al Jami with minor additions or deductions,” and uses as evidence Sayyid 
Imam’s 1993 book at length. Again, al-Zawahiri writes: “Regarding this [2007] document’s author [Sayyid 
Imam], he [already] announced his revisionism in his book, The Compilation [Compendium] in 1994 [sic; 
1993]. He then returned to private life under his real name in Yemen in a show of strange co-existence 
with the security services. After 11 September 2001, the Yemeni authorities arrested him on US orders and 
extradited him to Egypt . . .”[72]
But if Zawahiri’s accusation that Sayyid Imam rejects AQSL’s modus operandi beginning in 1993 is 
correct—a time during which Sayyid Imam was not under house arrest nor imprisoned but a free man who 
had returned to medicine and scholarship—how can his accusation [73] that this only occurred due to 
imprisonment and is first evidenced in Sayyid Imam’s 2007 ‘revisionist’ book, Doctrine of Rationalization [i.e. 
Right Guidance] for Jihad Activity in Egypt and the World (Wathiquat Tarshid Al-‘Aml Al-Jihadi fi Misr w’ Al-
Alam), also be correct?[74]
The present author advances what he considers a more compelling explanation of Gadahn’s highly 
circumscribed application of fiqh al-jihad, selective moral outrage, and attempted Islamic legalization of 
anti-American mass casualty terrorist attacks. Suppose one argues that AQSL conceives itself as a pan-
Islamist Sunni revolutionary ‘jihadist’ vanguard and that expulsion of the United States and its strategic allies 
from Muslim majority lands is for them a pre-requisite for reestablishing Sunni caliphal rule to oppose the 
current international order based in nation-states.[75] Further, suppose AQSL’s terrorist modus operandi 
has as its strategic goals on one hand, the inciting, catalyzing, galvanizing, uniting, and leading as vanguard 
this broader anti-American pan-Islamist front; and on the other, undermining U.S. resolve, morale, and 
legitimacy through a strategy of exhaustion, attrition, calculated and sophisticated information warfare, 
and attacking and dividing U.S. alliances.[76] Figure 1 below displays the variety of religio-legal rulings 
listed in Table 1 above, but organizes them based on the strategic logic of this AQSL pan-Islamic ‘jihadist’ 
revolutionary vanguardism.
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Figure 1: Revolutionary Pan-Islamist Jihadist Vanguardism versus Salafist Islamist Fiqh al-Jihad: Explaining 
AQSL’s Anti-American Mass Casualty Terrorism
Patterns otherwise incoherent, and conduct religiously and legally haram and vulnerable to severe criticism 
by knowledgeable militant Islamic scholars of fiqh al-jihad, are made intelligible by this analytical approach. 
Supposing this is the case, then, AQSL/Gadahn neither adhere to the path of al salaf al salih (the path of the 
righteous ancestors) nor to struggle and strive in the path of Allah (jihad fi sabil Allah), adhering to Allah’s 
Shari’a. This is certainly the considered judgment of those Corrections Current scholars whose shariatic 
judgments may be regarded as learned and motivated by the desire to raise Allah’s Word using all means, 
but only within the religious-legal confines of the shari’a. Could it be that AQSL is not a bona fide salafist 
organization but a pan-Islamist revolutionary political terrorist organization whose willingness to violate 
the shari’a of lawful jihad to achieve its objectives has come at the expense of Islam and the Islamic Call? 
Sayyid Imam, salafist scholar and former senior AQSL shari’a guide regards this as highly likely.He condemns 
AQSL’s ‘killing in masse doctrine’ and its murderous methods while drawing a parallel to violent secular 
52ISSN  2334-3745 December 2014
PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM Volume 8, Issue 6
revolutionary vanguardism.
[F]or the Muslim to place an objective for himself that is beyond his capacity and not suitable to his 
conditions, even if it is legitimate in itself, and then follow any road to attain his objective, without 
being bound by the restrictions of Shari’a, then this would have given precedence to his quest from 
himself over his God’s quest from him. This is not the way of the Muslims but the way of the revo-
lutionary secularists. In Islam, there is no such thing as ‘the end justifies the means’, even if the end 
is noble and legitimate to begin with. On the contrary, a Muslim worships Allah through the means 
used just as he worships Him through the ends sought. If he dies before getting his end, he gets the 
reward for trying, and he is absolved from the sin of what he could not do.[77]
To Sayyid Imam jihad is not an immoral, murderous rampage but a noble obligation that must abide by a 
definite religious-legal framework, and that must factor in the overall consequences for Muslims and Islam 
of the weighty decision to engage in jihad bis saif (jihad of the sword). “[H]e [Ayman al-Zawahiri] and 
Bin Ladin brought . . . gross calamities on the Afghani people in order to hit a number of buildings in the 
United States through treachery and betrayal [9/11],” Sayyid Imam asserts. “Does what brings catastrophes 
to the Muslims constitute legitimate jihad? Are those to be considered sane people? They neither spared the 
Muslims nor defeated their enemies. Jihad is a duty, but if it shirks Shari’a guidelines it becomes unethical 
warfare.”[78] “Those who fear Allah do not scale walls like thieves to reach their objectives,” he continues, 
“betraying their Emir [Mullah Omar], taking their enemy in cold blood [the United States of America], and 
bringing calamities to the Muslims. Those who do so like them are not men of goodness and piety. For the 
believers, this is Allah’s verdict on them.”[79]
The Corrections Current scholars offer a unique internal shariatic critique based in a salafist Islamist 
conception of Allah’s sharia that universalizes Allah’s law and intended moral universe to all human souls.
[80] A noble objective, Allah’s religion, cannot be fought for using ignoble means. In contrast, Gadahn offers 
a limited moral universe and a falsely truncated set of alternatives. “My Mujahid brother . . . who is satisfied 
with those acts, or who orders them, or conducts them,” Gadahn states, “is either ignorant needing education, 
or an agent planted amongst the ranks for the benefit of the enemies of the Mujahidin.[81]
However, is it not the case as proven above that Allah forbids the shedding of all human blood, without 
justice, and that Allah also forgives, and forgives again, with Divine mercy and clemency? Allah’s Qur’an 
states: “But, without doubt, I am (also) He that forgives again and again, to those who repent, believe, and 
do right—who in fine, are ready to receive True guidance” (20:8); “If Allah were to punish men according to 
what they deserve, he would not leave on the back of the (earth) a single living creature: but He gives respite 
for a stated term: when their term expires verily Allah has in His sight all His servants”(35:45); “Say: ‘O my 
servants who have transgressed against their souls! Despair not of the Mercy of Allah: for Allah forgives all 
sins for he is Oft-Forgiving, Most Merciful” (39:53).
Gadahn states that only two options exist to explain this intra-Muslim bloodshed: ignorance, or foreign 
agents planted amongst the mujahidin. But could he not also have said to them what can now be said of 
AQSL? It is neither ignorance nor others that are to blame, but willful and deliberate haram conduct by 
self-appointed ‘vanguards’ who elevate revenge and organizational survival above Allah’s shari’a. In the case 
of the TTP, al-Shabab, and ISI, the victims are Muslim innocents—men and women, children and elderly, 
shoppers in markets, students in schools, children in parks, worshippers in mosques. In the case of AQSL, 
the victims are American innocents—non-Muslim and Muslim—men and women, children and elderly, 
shoppers in markets, students in schools, children in parks, and worshippers in churches and synagogues and 
mosques. Are these not also sacred souls in Allah’s universe? [82] Does not the sharia of lawful jihad declare 
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as haram the treachery, betrayal, murder, and all ignominious conduct required to carry out terroristic acts to 
accomplish AQSL’s organizational objectives? Far from fighting tyranny, has not AQSL made itself a tyrant: a 
lawless despot, a murderer of sacred souls, a defiler of Muslim honor among uncounted millions who might 
otherwise be prepared to hear, listen to, and possibly respond to Allah’s Call? Does not the judgment Gadahn 
makes regarding Allah’s unforgiving of intentional murder and Gehenna’s eternal flames now, necessarily, 
apply to him?
If it is indeed correct that Adam Gadahn illicitly restricts the scope of fiqh al-jihad proscriptions and 
prescriptions to intra-Islamic bloodshed; and if by so doing he evades condemnation of, and often sanctions, 
other types of forbidden (haram) conduct including that associated with perpetrating mass casualty terrorist 
attacks against America and Americans; then, it has been proven that Gadahn—and by implication AQSL—is 
in violation of the very shari’a of lawful jihad it claims to fastidiously uphold. This finding may be leveraged 
as part of a broader information warfare strategy designed to delegitimize AQSL most especially in the eyes 
of that sliver of high value recruits and potential militants for whom upholding the sharia of lawful jihad is of 
paramount value.[83]
The fact that an Islamic law of war may be leveraged against AQSL anti-American mass casualty terrorism 
ironically discloses a fault-line at the very heart of AQSL’s uniqueness as a transnational terrorist 
organization. The legal violations above confirm, if corroborated, that Gadahn and AQSL have elevated anti-
Americanism above the shari’a of lawful jihad. While this ‘Far Enemy’ strategy may have much in common 
with other forms of revolutionary anti-imperialism, transnationalism, or terroristic targeting of perceived 
global adversaries, it has little in common with the evolved shari’a of lawful jihad which even in its militant 
expression, forbids and condemns treachery, targeting non-combatants, and the destruction of life, property, 
honor, and reputation of Muslims and non-Muslims alike. It is highly advisable that strategists apprise 
themselves of the militant critique of AQSL’s shari’a violations of lawful jihad. Prudence dictates, finally, that 
such an internal critique, where and when available, is an extremely efficient and uniquely potent means for 
delegitimizing terrorist adversaries.
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Sharq al-Awsat Online in Arabic, 17 October 2011. Interview with Najih Ibrahim: Ni’mat Majdi, “Egyptian Islamic Group Member Regrets Al-Sadat Assassination, 
Criticizes Mubarak,” in Al-Ra’y Online in Arabic, 25 October 2011; Suhayb Sharayir of Dubai Al-Arabiyah Television, “ Egyptian Experts Discuss ‘Jurisprudential 
Revisions’ in Al-Jama’ah al-Islamiyah,” 23 November 2012, in www.opensource.gov.; Najih Ibrahim, Untitled, in Al-Misri Al-Yawm, “Egypt: Statement by Leading 
Islamic Group Figure Says No-Violence Initiative Strong,” 02 July 2007; Najih Ibrahim, “Egypt: Former Islamic Group Leader Condemns Attack on Army Unit in 
Sinai,” in Al-Misri al-Yawm in Arabic, 9 August 2012, p. 12, in www.opensource.gov.
For Dr. Sayyid Imam Bin-Abd-al-Aziz Al-Sharif: Sayyid Imam, Doctrine of Rationalization [i.e. Right Guidance] for Jihad Activity in Egypt and the World [Wathiqat 
Tarshid Al-‘Aml Al-Jihadi fi Misr w’Al-Alam], November 2007, serialized in Al-Sharq al-Awsat in Arabic and partially available on www.opensource.gov; Sayyid 
Imam, Exposure of the Exoneration Book [Al-Ta’riya li Kitab Al-Tabri’ya], completed by the author March 25, 2008, and published in 13-parts in Arabic by Al-Misri 
Al-Yawm, between November 18 – December 2, 2008, available via www.opensource.gov. See also, the majority of a 10-hour, 2-day exclusive first-ever interview 
conducted in Turrah Prison, n.d. conducted just after release of ‘Rationalization,’ serialized in Arabic in Al-Hayah, and available in English translation through www.
opensource.com.
For the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG): Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), A Selected Translation of the LIFG Recantation Document, Transl. 
Mohammed Ali Musawi, Quilliam Foundation, www.quilliamfoundationorg/images/a_selected_translation_of_the-lifg.pdf, 2009. English translation of prefatory and 
introductory passages key to document’s intentions and context, and also summaries of each chapter appearing in the original Arabic provided by the document’s 
authors at the end of each chapter. The document, Revisionist [or Corrective] Studies of the Concepts of Jihad, Hisbah [Accountability], and Takfir [Judging others’ 
‘Muslimness’] —is approximately 400 pages organized in nine chapters and made available to the public 6 September 2009. Its six authors comprise the LIFG’s 
highest echelon leadership: current emir, Abdul Hakim al-Khwailidi Balhaj, aka: Abu Abdullah al-Sadiq; deputy emir, Khalid Muhammad Al-Sharif; spiritual 
leader, Sami Mustafa Al-Saadi, aka: Abu al-Munzir al Saaidi; its first emir, Miftah al-Mbruk al-Thawadi, aka: Abdul Ghaffar; military commander, Musafah Al-Said 
Qunayid, aka: Abu al-Zubair; and, Abdul Wahhab Muhammad Qayid, aka: Abu Idris (remarkably, also the elder brother of senior Al Qa’ida ideologue Abu Yahya 
al-Libi. For background, commentary, and additional analysis, see “The Daily Star: Deradicalizing Jihadists, the Libyan Way,” April 26, 2010, www.opensource.gov; 
Noman Benotman, “Al-Qaeda: Your Armed Struggle is Over,” September 10, 2010, www.quilliamfoundation.org/images/stories/pdfs/letter-to-bin-laden.pdf; Rania 
Karam, “Former LIFG leader: Bin Laden lacks Islamic authority to wage ‘Western Jihad,” May 5, 2010, www.magharaebia.com; Camille Tawil, “Noman Benotman 
criticizes al-Qaeda in bin Laden letter,” September 23, 2010, www.magharebia.com; Rania Karam, “Former LIFG leader questions bin Laden rationale,” April 29, 
2010, http://al-shorfa.com; Camille Tawil, “Al-Qaeda yet to respond to corrective studies forbidding killing of civilians,” September 15, 2009, http://al-shorfa.com; 
Camille Tawil, “Libya closes the case of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group,” March 30, 2010, http://al-shorfa.com; Nic Robertson and Paul Cruickshank, “In bid to 
thwart al Qaeda, Libya frees three leaders of jihadist group,” March 23, 2010, http://edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/africa/03/23/libya.jihadist.group; Vahid Brown, 
“A First Look at the LIFG Revisions,” September 14, 2009, www.jihadica.com/a-first-look-at-the-lifg-revisions/; Camille Tawil, “The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group’s 
revisions: one year later,” July 23, 2010, www.magharaebia.com; Jarret Brachman, “Why the LIFG’s Revisions are Falling on Our Deaf Ears,” September 21, 2009, 
http://jarretbrachman.net/?p=1036; Thomas Hegghammer, “Libyan Jihad Revisions,” September 8, 2009, www.jihadica.com/libyan-jihad-revisions/; Camille Tawil, 
“Libyan Islamists Back Away from al-Qaeda Merger in Reconciliation with Qaddafi Regime,” Terrorism Monitor, Vol.7, no. 17, June 18, 2009, www.jamestown.org; 
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Jarret Brachman, “Abu Yahya al-Libi’s ‘Human Shields in Modern Jihad’,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 1, No. 6, May 2008, pp. 1-4, www.ctc.usma.edu; Alison Pargeter, “LIFG 
Revisions Unlikely to Reduce Jihadist Violence,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 2, No. 10, October 2009, pp. 7-9, www.ctc.usma.edu; Paul Cruickshank, “LIFG Revisions Posing 
Critical Challenge to Al-Qa’ida,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 2, No. 12, December 2009, pp. 5-8, www.ctc.usma.edu; Ian Black, “Libya’s jihadis reject violence as leader bids 
for acceptance,” September 4, 2009, www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/sep/04/libyan-islamist-fighters-reject-violence; Oea Online, “Libyan Islamists’ ideology revision 
serialization to start 6 Sep – paper”, (Text of report by Libyan pro-government newspaper Oea: “Oea will, as of tomorrow [Sunday 6 September 2009], begin a 
serialization of the ideological revisions ‘corrective studies’ prepared recently by the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group [LIFG]”),September 6, 2009, www.opensource.
gov; Kamil al-Tawil [Camille Tawil], “Libyan Islamist Criticizes Tripoli’s Refusal to Release the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group Prisoners”, (Al Hayah Online in 
Arabic, “Report by Kamil al-Tawil, ‘Libyan Islamist Criticizes Tripoli’s Refusal to Release the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group’s Prisoners”), February 22, 2010, www.
opensource.gov; BBC Monitoring in Arabic, “BBC Monitoring: Review of Al-Qa’ida Activities in North Africa 16 Feb – 1 March [20]11,” www.opensource.gov; Paul 
Cruickshank, “How Muslim Extremists are turning on Osama Bin Laden,” June 7, 2008, www.nydailynews.com.
[51] Gadahn also explicitly warns his readers against abandoning this perennial duty: “It is not acceptable to consider these personal crimes as a pretext to deny the 
compulsory Jihad duty, as a mistake does not justify a bigger mistake.” (SOCOM-2012-0000004-HT, p. 18).
[52]See also the above discussion of Qur’an and ahadith in relation to the sinfulness of intentional homicide.
[53] This moderation will strike persons ignorant of AQSL’s religious Sunnite ecumenicalism as incorrect, but there is ample support documented by AQSL analysts. 
For one important recent study of this, see Nelly Lahoud Beware of Imitators: al-Qa’ida through the lens of its Confidential Secretary (Harmony Program, 4 June 
2012, The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, www.ctc.usma.edu, accessed 8 June 2012). Gadahn does not offer a frontal assault on immoderation beyond 
his critique of fanatical blood shedding, but one brief aside is telling. He states in reference to the potential downside of going public on these horrific attacks: 
“Now many regular people are looking at the Mujahidin as a group that does not hesitate to take people’s money by falsehood, detonating mosques, spilling the 
blood of scores of people to kill one or two who were labeled as enemies. While they shy away from listening to music or looking at a foreign woman—while those 
issues means very little to the common public, who see it as trivial issues. They are not, but [there is] no comparison to the sins that we are talking about.” Gadahn’s 
moderation vis-à-vis Sunnite orthodoxy is also evident in his harsh criticism of online ‘jihadi’ discussion groups: “As for the Jihadi forums, it is repulsive to most 
of the Muslims, or closed to them. It also distorts the face of al Qa’ida, due to what you know of bigotry, the sharp tone that characterizes most of the participants 
in these forums. It is also biased toward “Salafists” and not any Salafist, but the Jihadi Salafist, which is just one trend of the Muslim trends. The Jihad Salafist is a 
small trend within a small trend.” (SOCOM-2012-0000004-HT, p. 4). In reference to a specific forum run by Muhammad al-Misra’ri he states that though “he has 
excellent comments on Jihadi forums . . . his forum ’al-Tajdid‘ is not any better.” While agreeing with al-Misra’ri’s critique in relation to the ISI’s murderous rampage 
in Iraq, Gadahn nevertheless states: “As for other issues, like his definition of unification, some Fiqh theses, his exaggerated stiffness with the Shia, and those 
adhering to the buried, rejunevators of myths and pagan appearances” Gadahn states “not at all.” (Ibid., p. 5).
See Mohammad Kamali, Shari’a Law: An Introduction, pp 288-296, for a discussion of moderation and balance (al Wasatiyya) as a key Islamic religious precept.
[54] For key additional evidence confirming AQSL’s adherence to these shared premises, see Nelly Lahoud, Beware of Imitators: al-Qa’ida through the lens of its 
Confidential Secretary, 4 June 2012, Harmony Program, Combating Terrorism Center, West Point, www.ctc.usma.edu.
[55] Mohammad Kamali, Shari’a Law: An Introduction, p. 3.
[56] Ibid., p. 5; Also, when discussing whether media overexposure could undermine bin Laden’s persuasive influence, Gadahn expresses no moral revulsion 
and matter of factly reports: “It is all right if the Shaykh appeared now [early in 2011], then appeared in the 10th anniversary of the attacks of Manhattan and 
Washington.”
[57]Ibid.
[58] Ibid., p. 15.
[59]Cited in Thomas Joscelyn, “Analysis: Al Qaeda seeks to spin capture of top operative,” 1 December 2013, www.longwarjounral.org/archives/2013/12/analysis_
al_qaeda_se-print.php, accessed 2 December 2013.
[60] See note # 49 for original source material from which these disagreements are derived and compiled.
[61] Three additional arguments against reducing Islam to ‘jihadism’ may be made: (1) a rejection of the sectarian Kharijite claim that jihad bis saif is equivalent to 
faith as a pillar of Islam; (2) defense of the claim that while the five pillars of faith, prayer, alms, fasting, and pilgrimage are obligatory at a personal level (fard ‘ayn), 
the offensive jihad is a collective obligation that may be met by a section of the community on behalf of others; and (3) that being a ‘jihadist’ only means that one has 
met the eight qualifications for potential offensive jihad if required and declared, for example, that one is: a believer, mature and sound-minded, male, able-bodied, 
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economically independent, received parental permission, motivated by good intentions, capable of obedience and loyalty, will neither desert nor retreat, will be 
honest, straightforward, avoid treacherous acts including granting secure passage to enemies, and if he has killed, he must not mutilate. See Majid Khadduri, War 
and Peace in the Law of Islam, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1955, esp. pp. 67-69, 83-93.
[62] See for example: Alia Brahimi, Jihad and Just War in the War on Terror, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010; See also, her excellent, “Crushed in the Shadows: 
Why Al Qaeda Will Lose the War of Ideas,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 2010, Vol. 33, pp. 93-110.
[63] It is possible that Gadahn is partially willing to admit this. He states, for example (SOCOM-2012-0000004-HT, p. 15): “If that targeted person really deserves to 
be killed why not employ another method rather than random attacks, which is not tolerated by any mind or religion.[One] [w]hich does not differentiate between 
an enemy and a friend, the child and the old man, the man and the woman and the Muslim and the infidel?” He clearly states here that it is “not tolerated by any 
mind or religion,” not just Islam, and that these indiscriminate methods violate Allah’s forbidding of the shedding of blood of non-Muslim children, women, and old 
men.
[64]For the evolution of Islamic law toward the recognition of a community of sovereign Muslim nation-states, see: Majid Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of 
Islam, pp. 42-48; Majid Khadduri, The Islamic Law of Nations: Shaybani’s Siyar, Transl. by Majid Khadduri, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1966, esp. pp. 1-22, 60-
70.
[65] Gadahn (SOCOM-2012-0000004-HT, p. 18) cites a classic verse bearing on retribution from the Qur’an (2:190) at the opening of his model disavowal—“God 
almighty has stated: “Fight in the cause of Allah those who fight you, but do not transgress limits; for Allah loveth not transgressors.” In its present context, however, 
it is exclusive to intra-Islamic blood shedding and therefore cannot be extended to Gadahn’s understanding of retributive justice in relation to non-Muslims.
[66] It appears that Gadahn, while publicly declaring a “Crusader-Zionist” conspiracism, in his letter is far closer to recognizing Islamic responsibility for the 
present catastrophe facing the AQSL ‘jihadists’. For example, he states: “I have no doubt that what is happening to the Jihadi movement in these countries is not 
misfortune, but punishment by God on us because of our sins and injustices, or because the sins of some of us and the silence of the rest of us. I do not see that 
my statement is an exaggeration and intimidation, as the Qur’anic verses, the Hadith and the scholar’s statements are plenty, and there is no need to state them” 
(SOCOM-2012-0000004-HT, p. 15). And again: “Injustice is one of the reasons behind the defeat and disappointment, and the befallen miseries and sedition by the 
Muslims public and the Mujahidin” (p. 18). For the jurisprudential requirements for full legal competency, see: Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Principles of Islamic 
Jurisprudence, Third Revised and Enlarged Edition, Cambridge, UK: Islamic Texts Society, 2003, pp. 411-454.
[67] Bin Laden apparently found the TTP-sponsored attempted mass-casualty terrorist attack in New York City’s Times Square by naturalized American citizen 
Faisal Shahzad just such a treacherous breach. Pakistani-American Faisal Shahzad is now serving a mandatory life sentence for his guilty plea on ten felony counts 
for attempting to murder pedestrians in the failed 1 May 2010 vehicle-born improvised explosive device (VIED) deployed in Times Square. For Bin Laden, as a 
Muslim having taken an oath of citizenship, he was thereby dutifully bound from violating that oath. In one of the Abbottabad letters (SOCOM-2012-0000015-HT) 
Bin Laden writing to Sheikh Atiyyatullah says: “Perhaps you monitored the trial of brother Faysal Shahzad. In it he was asked about the oath he took when he got 
American citizenship. And he responded by saying that he lied. You should know that it is not permissible in Islam to betray trust and break a covenant. Perhaps 
the brother was not aware of this. Please ask the brothers in [the] Taliban Pakistan [TTP] to explain this point to their members. In one of the pictures, brother 
Faysal Shahzad was with commander Mahsud; please find out if Mahsud knows that getting American citizenship requires taking an oath not to harm America. 
This is a very important matter because we do not want al-Mujahidin to be accused of breaking a covenant” (p. 7). We shall return to this matter in a subsequent 
section. In another letter presumably from bin Laden or possibly Sheikh Atiyyatulah to Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) emir Nashir al-Wuhayshi (aka: 
Abu Basir) written post-October 2010 (SOCOM-2012-0000016-HT) he states in relation to encouraging attacks on United States soil: “If the [Yemeni] government 
does not agree to a truce, concentrate on the Yemeni emigrants who come back to visit Yemen and have American visas or citizenship and would be able to conduct 
operations inside America as long as they have not given their promises not to harm America. We need to extend and develop our operations in America and not 
keep it limited to blowing up airplanes.”
[68] This Eqyptian Islamic Group shari’a critique of the numerous shari’a violations arising from the 9/11 terrorist operandi is well worth citing at length: “Hijacking 
planes and blowing them up involves frightening and killing those whom it is forbidden to terrorize and kill, either because there are Muslim passengers on the 
plane, or because there are non-Muslim children and women and elderly, whom it is not permitted to kill even in a state of war—in addition to the possibility of 
killing those whom it is not permitted to kill if the plane crashes into a civilian target when the hijacker does not know who is there. In addition, hijacking and 
blowing up planes involves a breach of faith towards the company that owns the plane and towards the passengers. The company gave the hijacker a ticket to use its 
plane on the condition that he not endanger its wellbeing and the wellbeing of the passengers, and when the hijacker hijacks and blows up the plane, he has violated 
this pledge. Likewise, the passengers all believe that the other passengers do not want to harm them and do not harbor any ill will, and this is based on custom and 
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the established usage among those who do business with airlines. This amounts to a guarantee of security [aman], or something approaching it, which forbids one 
to inflict harm. . . Hijacking planes and using its passengers as bargaining chips in order to achieve [the hijackers’] demands, and terrorizing them, and perhaps 
[even] killing them in order to put pressure on the governments of their countries or those countries’ occupiers, is forbidden in shari’a, because this is tantamount 
to punishing innocents (i.e. the passengers) in order to compel the occupier or transgressor to comply with the demands of the hijacker, and because most of these 
passengers do not have anything to do with the hijackers’ cause, and perhaps they are even sympathetic to them without the hijackers’ knowing this, and all of this 
is contrary to justice.” (See, Islam and the Laws of War [Al-Islam wa-tahdhib al-hurub]), in MEMRI #1301, “ Al-Gama’a Al-Islamiyya vs. Al-Qaeda,” 27 September 
2006, p.3).
[69]Army Major Nidal Malik Hasan, M.D., Army psychiatrist, was convicted and on 15 April 2013 sentenced to death for the 5 November 2009 shooting and 
murder at Fort Hood, Texas of 13 soldiers, and wounding of 31.
Dhokhar and Tamerlan Tsarnaev detonated two pressure cooker bombs during the Boston marathon, killing four (two females, aged 29 and 23; an 8 year-old boy; 
and MIT police officer, Sean A. Collier, killed three days after the bombing), and injuring 264 others, many seriously and requiring amputation, including the 
serious wounding of a Transit Police officer.
[70] Released January 2008 on the web at www.megaupload.com?d=3TEBKCJW, accessed by author 12 January 2011. In its English translation (by Anonymous 
translator) it runs 268 pages; in Arabic referred to as running either 188 or 216 pages.
[71] See al-Zawahiri, Exoneration, especially, pp. 4 (b), 12 (b), 76, 95, 113, 116, 120, 149, 151, 153, 197, 246, 247, 249, 258, 259, 263. Pagination is not furnished on 
this downloaded text so persons who seek to corroborate this must first paginate the text.
[72] Ibid., p. 4 b. See also Sayyid Imam’s rebuttal of al-Zawahiri’s claim (see , Exposure, Part 2, p. 4) that persons like Sayyid Imam who criticize al Qaeda must “serve 
the Crusading Zionist interests” even though al-Zawahiri admits that “what I denounced in The [Rationalization] Document I denounced previously in my 1993 
book Al-Jami [fi talab al-Ilam al-Sharif], and actually before I wrote the book” (p. 4).
[73] See al-Zawahiri, Exoneration, esp. pp. 1-76.
[74] Al-Zawahiri’s contradiction is key, but it is also the case that his ad hominem critique can be true, yet irrelevant to the validity or lack thereof of Sayyid Imam’s 
shariatic case against AQSL. For this informal fallacy that seeks to refute the validity of a claim by attacking the validity of the claimant, see Irving M. Copi and Carl 
Cohen, Introduction to Logic, 13th ed., Upper Saddle River, New Jersey, Pearson Prentice Hall, 2009, Pp. 127-131.
[75] See, for example: Thomas Hegghammer, Jihad in Saudi Arabia: Violence and Pan-Islamism since 1979, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010; Nelly 
Lahoud, Beware of Imitators: al-Qa’ida through the lens of its Confidential Secretary. Nasser al-Wuhaishi, present emir of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 
(AQAP), and AQSL second-in-command, in a March 2014 video posted to a militant Islamist website states: “The Crusader enemy, dear brothers, still possesses 
cards which he moves around. We have to remember that we are always fighting the biggest enemy. . . . We have to remove the cross, [and] the bearer of the cross, 
America.” (See: Reuters, “Yemen’s al-Qaida Leader Vows to Attack America in New Video,” 16 April 2014, www.voanews.com/1894546.html, accessed 17 April 2014.
[76] For a comprehensive analysis of AQSL’s terrorist modus operandi in relation to its core political and strategic objectives, see P. Kamolnick, Countering 
Radicalization and Recruitment to Al-Qaeda: Fighting the War of Deeds, Letort Papers, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 2014.
[77] Rationalization, Part 1, pp. 4-5; citing Qur’an 4:100, 5:27, 5:64, and 99:7-8; and two agreed upon ahadith, one in Sahih-Muslim, the other agreed upon by Ibn 
Abbas; Also, Sayyid Imam citing Qur’an 99:7-8: ‘[T]he Almighty said: “Then shall anyone who has done an atom’s weight of good, see it [taken into account on the 
Day of Judgment]. And anyone who has done an atom’s weight of evil, shall see it.”
[78] Exposure of the Exoneration Book [Al-Ta’riya li Kitab Al-Tabri’ya], Part 10, p. 2; see also, Exposure, Part 3, p. 2.
(Text completed by the author March 25, 2008, and published in 13-parts in Arabic by Al-Misri Al-Yawm, between November 18 – December 2, 2008, available via 
www.opensource.gov).
[79] Ibid., Part 5, p. 4.
[80] For a most comprehensive conception that includes but extends beyond humankind to the entire Created world with emphasis on the earth’s environment, see: 
Professor Mustafa Abu-Sway, [n.d.] “Towards an Islamic Jurisprudence of the Environment: Fiqh al-Bi’ah fil-Islam, at www.iol.ie/~afifi/Articles/environment.htm, 
accessed 18 December 2013.[n.d]
[81] SOCOM-2012-0000004-HT, p. 18.
[82] Thirty-two Muslims (26 men, and six women) were murdered in the 9/11 attacks. Twenty-eight Muslims died in the twin towers of the World Trade Center, 
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and three were among the passengers on the hijacked planes. These three were a husband and wife, who was at that time seven-months pregnant. Nationalities 
include: Pakistan, Bangladesh, Guiana, Sri Lanka, Gambia, Ivory Coast, Yemen, Iran, Ethiopia, Turkey, Trinidad and Tobago, Burma, Albania, Greece, and India. 
According to al Araybia, “the most famous Muslim victim is the only Arab among all 9/11 victims, the Yemeni Abdul Salam Mallahi, who worked at the Marriott 
Hotel in World Trade Center. He was very brave and helped people escape the building. His body has never been found. The oldest victim was an Iranian woman 
who was 69 years old, and the youngest were two 25-year old men, Zohoto Ibis, from Turkey, and a Pakistani, Khaled Shahid” (Kamal Kobeisi, “Remembering the 
Muslims who were killed in the 9/11 attacks,” http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/09/11/166286.html, accessed 5 March 2014). Murder left in its wake many 
family tragedies. “Baraheen Ashrafi’s husband, Mohammed Chowdhury, died atop the north tower, where he was a waiter at Windows on the World. Ashrafi, 38, 
lives in Edmond, Oklahoma, where she moved with her two children to be near her sister.; “Ysuff Salie’s daughter Rahma, who was seven months pregnant, and 
Rahma’s husband, Michael, were passengers aboard the jet that crashed into the north tower. Ysuff, 64, and his wife, Haleema, 58, live in Newton, Mass, and run 
two bakery-cafes”; “Mehr Tariq’s husband Taiq Amanullah, an assistant vice president at Fiduciary Trust, died in the south tower. She is 49 and lives with her two 
young adult children in California’s Silicon Valley, where she moved in 2005 to be near her brothers.” (Cited in Rick Hampson, USA Today, “For families of 9/11 
victims, a new pain,” 9 September 2010, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2010-09-03-1Amuslims911_CV_N.htm?csp, accessed 5 March 2014): In the 
East African embassy bombings (see, Indictment, United States v. Usama bin Laden et al., S(2) 98 Cr. 1023 (LBS) (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 1998)), 7 August 1998, excluding 
Americans, ten employees of the US embassy compound were murdered in Dar es Salaam (lit: ‘Abode of Peace’; Counts 224-234 in the Federal indictment, see 
pp. 81-82): Abdurahman Abdulla, Elias Elisha, Hassan Siyad Halane, Ramadhani Mahundi, Abdallah Mohammed, Abas William Mwila, Shamte Yusuph Ndange, 
Omari Yusufu Nyumbu, Mtendeje Rajabu, Said Rogathi, and Dotto Selemani; In the US Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, Counts 11-223 apply to the 212 embassy 
compound employees murdered, see, pp. 71-79).
[83] See endnote 76 for the author’s advocacy of a broader War of Deeds’ within which AQSL’s failure to adhere to the shari’a of lawful jihad is but one key 
component.
